Foundationalism and The Theory of Justification in Epistemology
CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 2: EXERGESES ON THE THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION AND EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS CHAPTER 3: THE CONCEPT OF FOUNDATIONS AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN EPISTEMOLOGY:
- The Nature and Meaning of Epistemic Foundations
- The Philosophical Development of Epistemic Foundations.
- Skepticism and the Development of Epistemic Foundations
- Plato on the Foundation of Knowledge
- Descartes' Epistemic Foundation
- Husserl's Epistemic Foundation
- The Idea of Foundations in Contemporary Epistemology
- Theories of Epistemic Justification
- The Foundationalist Theory of Epistemic Justification
- The Coherentist Theory of Epistemic justification
- The Theory of Foundherentism
- The Relevance of the Theory of Justification Contemporary Epistemology
- The Theory of Perception in Foundationalism
- The Theory of the Given in Perceptual Foundations
- The Sense-Data Theory of The Given
- The Object Theory of The Given
- The Immediate Experience Theory of The Given
- Perceptual Foundation in A Priori Knowledge
- A Critical Review of the Foundationalist Epistemic Justification
- African Epistemology and the Foundationalist Epistemic Justification
- Conclusion
Foreword
The shift from
the traditional
account of
Epistemology as
the theory of
knowledge to the
contemporary
conceptionalization
of defining
epistemology as
the theory of
justification has
thrown up diverse
polemics about the
status or our
claims to
knowledge. This
contemporary
thrust to
epistemology is to
find firm grounds
against the acidic
criticism of
skeptics who
believe that the
quest for
certainty in
epistemology is
chimerical. The
arguments of the
Skeptics seems
even more solid
and made more
interesting after
Edmond Gettier
removed the bottom
from the edifice
of knowledge by
noting that even
our definition of
knowledge as
justified true
belief is not
valid. The
traditional JTB
account of
knowledge had
given hope to the
claims that
epistemic warrant
can be founded on
the grounds for
the justification
of our epistemic
beliefs. But the
Gettier problem
seems to erase
that hope. In all
of these, however,
epistemology still
goes on. And this
is where the
relevance of this
work comes to the
fore. The position
taken by J. 0.
Inyang by
asserting the
indispensability
of foundations in
epistemic
justification
seems to restore
hope in
epistemology very
strongly. This is
because some
contemporary
epistemologist
have announced the
demise of
epistemology,
especially in its
traditional garb.
But in this work
Inyang has adduced
very strong
arguments to show
that the
foundationalist
thesis provides
the indispensable
bottom that is
necessary in
epistemic
justification.
There is no doubt
that this work
which expounds
extensively on the
indispensability
of foundations in
epistemic
justification, is
going to provide
the necessary
education of the
minds of concerned
epistemologists
who really care
about establishing
firm grounds for
the claims to
knowledge. This
work equally
answers to the
skeptics challenge
in their
traditionally view
that the claim to
certainty in
epistemology
cannot stand. But
this work argues
that the skeptics
challenge only
serves to prompt
epistemologist to
take the quest for
the search for
evidence, reasons
and proofs as
justifications for
epistemic
certainty, very
seriously. This
work, therefore,
is a r T1 s t read
for serious minded
epistemologists,
students of
philosophy in
general, and
curious seekers of
knowledge.
Professor K. A.
Ojong
Department of
Philosophy
University of
Calabar, Calabar
Preface
Most of the inherent problems in epistemology raised by the skeptics are as a result of the inability of the traditional epistemologist to arrive at certainty. The inability to arrive at certainty in knowledge is presupposed by the lack of justification and even where justification is given for any belief, skepticism still creeps in probably because such justification is not secured or founded on anything. Thus the moment any justification of a belief is insecure or lacks foundation, the problem of infinite regress or circularity comes in. Epistemology used to be described as the theory of knowledge. But the most significant feature of contemporary epistemology is that the label has become inappropriate. More accurately, contemporary epistemology according to John Kekes is described as the theory of justification. The shift from the theory of knowledge to the theory of justification is as a result of the serious doubt about the possibility of attaining the kind of certainty that knowledge has been taken to involve. Based on this, three problems have been identified as having connection with the theory of justification and they bother on firstly, whether our beliefs have a secure foundation. Secondly, if our beliefs do not have, a secure foundation, how can they be justified? Thirdly, what sorts of consideration are relevant to the justification of our beliefs? The above questions raised suggest that the problem of epistemology is to specify the conditions in which a high level of hypothesis can be obtained. It is this very task that has led us to focus on the theory of foundationalism which tries to proffer a foundational justification of our beliefs and the key idea of the theory is that, there are some basic propositions which carry with them their own justifications needing no support, and also constitute the base upon which our beliefs rests. The nature of this basic or foundational proposition is sought for in sense perception. Thus in this work, we contend that perceptual foundations are indispensable in any epistemic justification. This indispensable bottom is necessary but hypothetical and may not be indubitable and incorrigible, as some hardcore phenomenal foundationalists have claimed.